

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

DATE: 19 Sept 72

TO: The Director

FROM: GACarver, Jr.

SUBJECT:

REMARKS:

Attached is Tom Polgar's answer to Col. Kennedy's query relayed in Headquarters 1159 (also attached). I will give an oral gist of this to Kennedy to close the circuit.

George A. Carver, Jr.  
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachments



cc: C/FE (EYES ONLY)

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

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HEADQUARTERS.

25X1 REF: HEADQUARTERS 1159

1. ENEMY POLICY STATEMENTS

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NO EVIDENCE OF RECENT CHANGE IN ENEMY TERRORIST POLICY IN TERMS OF TARGETS.

2. FOLLOWING ARE OUR CONCLUSIONS ON BASIC ENEMY POLICY REGARDING TERRORISM:

A. USE OF TERRORISM IS INTEGRAL PART OF VC/NVA OFFICIAL POLICY IN SVN.

B. TERRORISM AS PARTY INSTRUMENT OF WAR IS PRIMARILY DIRECTED AT DESTRUCTION OF GVN STRUCTURE.

C. TERRORIST ACTIVITIES HAVE NOT BEEN DIRECTED AGAINST INDIVIDUAL U.S. PERSONNEL.

D. TERRORIST ACTIONS ARE SOMETIMES DIRECTED AGAINST U.S. INSTALLATIONS BUT NO INDIVIDUAL THEREIN

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IS SINGLED OUT.

E. WHEREAS TERRORISM AND ASSASSINATION WERE FORMERLY EXCLUSIVE MISSIONS OF SELECT VC SECURITY SECTIONS AND SPECIAL ACTION (SAPPER) UNITS OF PARTY COMMITTEES, SUCH TASKS NOW ALSO UNDERTAKEN BY MILITARY PROSELYTING SECTIONS, UNDERGROUND AGENTS, SECRET GUERRILLAS, LOCAL FORCES.

F. VC MODUS OPERANDI IN IMPLEMENTATION OF TBERORIST AND ASSASSINATION PLANS REMAINS CONSTANT. ONCE TARGET SELECTED FOR SUCH ACTION, CASING OF TARGET BEGINS, DOSSIER PREPARED ON HIM AND FORWARDED TO NEXT HIGHER ECHELON OF PARTY STRUCTURE ALONG WITH REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF PLAN. AFTER STUDY, PARTY COMMITTEE AT THAT LEVEL DECIDES ON PUNISHMENT TO BE ADMINISTERED. NORMALLY NO ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS ARE CONDUCTED ON TARGET-OF-OPPORTUNITY BASIS.

3. EXPERIENCE HAS BORNE OUT ABOVE POLICY RESPECTING U.S. CIVILIANS AS THERE NO RECORD OF U.S. CIVILIANS HAVING BEEN KILLED BY VC SINCE TET 68 ALTHOUGH OPPORTUNITIES ABOUND IN SAIGON AND OUTLYING PROVINCES FOR VC TO DO SO. THIS

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APPLIES EQUALLY TO INDIVIDUAL U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL OUTSIDE OF COMBAT AREAS.

4. ENEMY POLICY RESPECTING U.S. PERSONNEL CAPTURED DURING COMBAT IS NOT TO KILL THEM, UNLESS CIRCUMSTANCES FORCE ENEMY DO SO, BUT TO TRANSFER THEM TO HANOI WHERE THEY KEPT FOR DIPLOMATIC BARGAINING PURPOSES. THIS CONNECTION PLEASE SEE LATEST SUBSTANTIATING LAO DONG STATEMENT CONTAINED PARA 1A(3) FVS 30,911 OF 3 SEPT 72 WHICH ADDS "IT MORE DESIREABLE CAPTURE ONE AMERICAN ALIVE THAN TO KILL 30 OTHERS."

5. WHILE PRECEDING STATEMENT APPEARS INDIRECTLY TO SUGGEST U.S. PERSONNEL MIGHT BECOME PRIME TARGET FOR KIDNAPPINGS, IF READ IN CONTEXT, WE BELIEVE CENTRAL COMMITTEE MERELY EQUATING VALUE OF LIVE VERSUS DEAD AMERICANS, RELATIVE TO BARGAIN POTENTIAL, RATHER THAN DEPARTING FROM CURRENT POLICY OUTLINED ABOVE.

6. WE HAVE CONTINUOUSLY ASSESSED ENEMY MOTIVES BEHIND EXCLUSION OF U.S. PERSONNEL FROM VC TERRORIST ACTION AND CONCLUDE EXCLUSION IS BASED LAO DONG DECISION.

7. THERE NO EVIDENCE IN LATEST LAO DONG RESOLUTION 13 OR OTHER REPORTS TO INDICATE U.S. PERSONNEL ARE TARGETS

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FOR VC/NVA TERRORIST ACTION. THERE IS, HOWEVER, OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE THAT GVN PERSONNEL ARE DEFINITELY TARGETS. RESOLUTION 13 EXPLICIT ON THIS POINT AND URGES ASSASSINATION OF TYRANTS, (AND WE HAVE SEEN IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS POLICY). FURTHER, ASSASSINATION LISTS ARE TO BE READY FOR USE ON ANNOUNCEMENT OF CEASEFIRE AND ENSUING PERIOD OF CONFUSION.

8. HIGH LEVEL GVN OFFICIALS, THOUGH NOT MENTIONED<sup>71</sup> IN RESOLUTION 13 AS TARGETS, ARE CERTAINLY INCLUDED. THIS BORNE OUT BY ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATIONS OF PRIME MINISTER HUONG IN FEBRUARY 69 AND GENERAL NGUYEN VAN KIEM, THIEU'S MILITARY CABINET CHIEF IN MARCH 69, AND SUCCESSFUL MURDERS OF LE VAN TRI, MINISTER OF EDUCATION IN JANUARY 69 AND PROFESSOR NGUYEN VAN BONG, HEAD OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION INSTITUTE SAIGON, ON 10 NOVEMBER 71. CONFESSED KILLERS OF BONG STATED THEY ALSO RESPONSIBLE FOR ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF LABOR LEADER TRAN QUOC BUU IN SEPTEMBER 71.

9. AS U.S. ELECTION PERIOD APPROACHES, AND AS HANOI'S MILITARY PLANS ARE FOILED, THERE COULD BE REVERSAL VC TERRORIST POLICY TOWARDS U.S. PERSONNEL. ONE OMINOUS SIGN IS IN DRV/PRG STATEMENTS AND HANOI'S INDIRECT SANCTION OF ARAB

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TERROR IN MUNICH CONTAINED ARMY PAPER QUAN DOI NHA DAN,  
13 SEPT 72.

10. WHILE THIS SUFFICIENT TO CAUSE SPECULATION ON  
POSSIBLE CHANGE IN ENEMY TERRORIST POLICY TOWARDS U.S. PERSONNEL  
WE BELIEVE THERE WILL BE NO CHANGE ON A SHORT TERM BASIS.  
HANOI IS AWARE HIGH VALUE WHICH USG AND AMERICAN PUBLIC  
PLACE ON AMERICAN LIVES AND ADVERSE EFFECT SUCH TERRORIST  
ACTIVITY COULD HAVE ON U.S. PUBLIC OPINION. AS COURTING U.S.  
PUBLIC OPINION IS ONE OF HANOI'S PRIMARY OBJECTIVES, WE DOUBT  
IT WOULD FOLLOW ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST ROUTE, AT LEAST  
DURING PRE-ELECTION PHASE.

11. ON TWO BASIC QUESTIONS PARA 2 REF, GVN, ESPECIALLY AT  
HIGHEST LEVELS, IS VERY SENSITIVE TO DANGERS OF VC TERRORIST  
POLICY. WITH RESPECT TO SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS, ONLY  
AMBASSADOR BUNKER IS GUARDED WITH FULL CONSISTANCY. WEYAND,  
WHITEHOUSE AND COS ARE MISTLY ACCOMPANIED BY SECURITY  
PERSONNEL, BUT NOT ALWAYS. BELOW THAT LEVEL EVERYBODY IS  
ON HIS OWN. MAJOR INSTALLATIONS ARE FAIRLY WELL GUARDED.

12. CHOICE, AS WE FOUND, BOILD DOWN TO ESTABLISHING  
SECURITY PRACTICES WHICH WOULD BE EFFECTIVE BUT ALSO MOST  
ONEROUS TO INDIVIDUALS OR TO TAKE CALCULATED RISKS BASED

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ON ASSESSMENT OVERALL SECURITY SITUATION, ENEMY INTENTIONS  
AND LAWS OF PROBABILITY. GIVEN EXISTING SITUATION IN VIETNAM  
WHICH PRODUCES SUFFICIENT STRAINS AND TENSIONS ON ITS OWN, I  
WOULD BE MOST RELUCTANT TO PUT OR SUGGEST ADDITIONAL CONTROLS  
ON MOVEMENTS OF U.S. PERSONNEL. IN THIS DECISION I AM ALSO  
INFLUENCED BY FACT THAT OUR NUMBERS HERE ARE SUCH THAT  
EFFECTIVE PROTECTION COULD NOT BE PROVIDED EXCEPT UNDER  
MOST RIGIDLY REGIMENTED CONDITIONS, WHICH SIMPLY NOT  
WARRANTED UNDER THE EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES. E2 IMPDET

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